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1. The Sustainability of the Czech     
Exchange-Rate Regime in 1996
In 1996, the Czech Republic was a country with history of four successful
transitional years. The Czech transitional strategy was based on a rapid trade and
financial liberalisation, voucher privatisation scheme and stabilisation program for
which a pegged exchange rate provided nominal anchor with the support of a
balanced budget. During transitional years of 1993-1996
1 these transitional steps led
to a relatively low inflation, increasing role of a private sector, economic growth and a
fast development of financial markets.
As a consequence of these successful trends, the Czech Republic faced
benefits and costs of capital inflows, and similarly to group of other developing
economies, its emerging market became attractive for foreign investors. Countries
from this group often suffer from various types of external crisis
2 such as
                                                
1 The paper analyses the Czech experience although a transitional process started in
1990 when the Czech Republic was a member country of the former Czechoslovakia.
2 Eichengreen, Rose, Wyplosz  (1995) examine currency attacks in a set of developing
and industrial countries. Frankel, Rose (1996) investigate reasons of  large currency crashes in
100 developing countries. Milesi-Ferretti,  Razin (1996) analyse the East-Asian and Latin
American experience with external imbalances. Sachs, Tornel, Velasco (1996b) study reasons
of financial crises in 20 emerging markets (excluding Eastern Europe).  Calvo, Mendoza
(1996),  Dornbusch, Werner (1994)   and  Sachs,  Tornel,  Velasco (1996a) concentrate on8
unsustainable foreign indebtedness (Latin America), liquidity crisis (Mexico) or  they
need to prevent crises at the costs of restrictions on capital flows (East Asia). Since
some features of the Czech economic development were similar to those of the
above-mentioned group, their experience with the exchange-rate mismanagement
became relevant for the Czech Republic. It was very important to recognise whether
the exchange-rate regime maintained by authorities was sustainable - whether it
allowed for the exchange rate to move in accordance with the economic
fundamentals.
Table 1
Basic  Macro-Economic Indicators (in %)
s1 s2 i1 i2 y p
1992 27.45 25.38 28.53 27.23 -6.40 11.00
1993 20.23 22.53 26.56 24.85 -0.67 20.80
1994 20.11 22.17 30.04 28.41   2.62 10.00
1995 22.76 23.18 32.18 31.48   4.84   9.10
1996 22.74 22.74 33.81 33.90   4.36   8.80
Notes: Indicators are defined as follows: s1=(GDP-C-G)/GDP in nominal terms, s2=(GDP-C-
G)/GDP in real terms, i1=Investment/GDP in nominal terms, i2=Investment/GDP in real
terms, y is growth rate of GDP in real terms, and p is inflation (CPI).
Data sources: Czech National Bank (CNB), Czech Statistical Office (CSU).
Let us summarise briefly the economic development in the Czech Republic in
1993-1996 using a set of indicators that are usually watched by analysts as warning
signals of forthcoming external crisis
3. Table 1 shows that during the analysed
transitional years both the saving ratio as well as investment ratio were relatively
high. However, there was a persistent gap between domestic savings and investment
needs of the economy. The country’s inflation and growth record was satisfactory.
Specifically, in 1994-1996 after shocks from both the price liberalisation as well as
the Czechoslovakia’s separation had been absorbed, the growth rate was high and
inflation reduced to a one-digit scale. However, inflation as well as nominal interest
                                                                                                                                            
Mexican experience with external crises. Helpman, Leiderman, Bufman (1994) describe the
problems with external balance of the three sample countries: Chile, Israel and Mexico.
3 Mainly, these are indicators applied in other case studies by Calvo, Mendoza (1996),
Cohen (1985),  Dornbusch, Werner (1994),  Eichengreen, Rose,  Wyplosz  (1995),  Frankel,
Rose (1996), Haque, Kumar, Mark, Mathieson (1996), Milesi-Ferretti, Razin (1996), Sachs,
Tornel, Velasco (1996a) and Sachs, Tornel, Velasco (1996b).9
rates remained higher than in the countries whose currencies served as the basket
ones.
Table 2 demonstrates increasing seriousness of the problem of external
imbalance implied by the saving-investment gap. It is worth noting that the sensitivity
of the  Czech economy to the external imbalance was high due to a large degree of
its openness.
Table 2
Indicators of External Balance (in %)
x1 x2 m1 m2 tb1 tb2 ca
1992 56.62 54.18 56.25 48.72  0.38   5.46 -1.09
1993 56.73 60.31 54.50 55.53  2.23   4.79  0.37
1994 52.45 58.88 52.88 58.27 -0.42   0.61 -0.14
1995 51.14 60.55 56.34 66.09 -5.21  -5.55 -2.98
1996 58.02 61.11 65.64 71.73 -7.61 -10.6% -8.57
Notes: Indicators are defined as follows: x1=Export/GDP in nominal terms, x2=Export/GDP
in real terms, m1=Import/GDP in nominal terms, m2=Import /GDP in real terms, tb1 is a ratio
of trade balance to GDP in nominal terms, tb2 is a ratio of trade balance to GDP in real terms,
ca is a ratio of current balance to GDP in nominal terms.
Data sources: Czech National Bank (CNB), Czech Statistical Office (CSU).
Figure 1 shows the various measures of competitiveness of the Czech exports.
The indicators based on producer price indexes, consumer price index, unit labour
cost and effective price indexes of exporters suggest that the value of the Czech
crown in real terms returned to its pre-transitional level in 1995. The real appreciation
of the Czech crown was a consequence of the cumulative inflation differential as well
as nominal appreciation of the Czech crown that followed in 1996 after a change in
the exchange-rate regime as shown on Figure 2. The broadening of bands  was a
policy response of the central bank to  large capital inflows that reached the peak in
















































































































Notes: Indicators are defined as follows: RER1 is index of competitiveness derived as a real
exchange rate using producer price indexes, RER2 is index of competitiveness derived as a
real exchange rate using consumer price indexes, RER3 is index of competitiveness derived
as a real exchange rate using unit labour costs, and RER4 is index of competitiveness derived
according to the NIESR methodology of real effective exchange rate with weights derived
from the matrix trading of major trading partners.
Data sources: Czech National Bank (CNB), Czech Statistical Office (CSU), International
Financial Statistics (IMF), National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR).11
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1991:1 1991:4 1992:3 1993:2 1994:1 1994:4 1995:3 1996:2
RXindex
Notes: RXindex is nominal exchange rate index of the Czech crown  vis-a-vis its basket
currencies (with approximate weights of 65% for DM and 35% for $). The dotted lines show
exchange-rate bands.
Data sources: Czech National Bank (CNB).
In addition to domestic factors, the problem of external imbalance was
worsened by “foreign fundamentals” that are summarised in Table 3. A development
of both foreign  demand for the Czech exports as well as world inflation was
unfavourable in 1996.
Table 3
Foreign Sector - Indicators (in %)
p1 p2 p3 s1 s2
1992 3.28 4.69 2.93   4.24   7.59
1993 2.65 4.01 3.19   1.30   2.52
1994 2.39 2.94 3.22 10.65 10.63
1995 2.23 1.91 1.44 10.17   5.85
1996 2.08 1.93 -2.16   5.50 -1.58
Notes: Indicators are defined as follows: p1 is the US inflation measured by CPI,  p2 is the
German inflation measured by CPI, p3 is the weighted inflation of foreign importers, s1 is
index of  demand for Czech exports (weighted average of trading partners´ demands), and  s2
is index of  demand for Czech exports (average weighted according to a basket definition).
Data sources: International Financial Statistics (IMF).12
Although the current account deficit reached 8.6% of GDP in 1996, it  was
sustainable at least in the medium-run from the point of view of debt indicators as
confirmed by Table 4. The Czech economy started the period of external imbalance
with a very low debt to GDP ratio and relatively high level of foreign reserves  built up
during period of capital inflows. Hence the debt burden did not exceed the usually
considered safety limit of 40%.
Table 4
Indicators of Debt Sustainability (in %)
D1 D2 FX1 FX2
1992 7.57 25.33   3.01 12.79
1993 6.36 27.21 12.40 20.00
1994 6.11 29.67 17.32 24.67
1995 4.29 36.25 30.72 38.09
1996 3.27 39.72 23.81 33.51
Notes: Indicators are defined as follows: D1=(Government Foreign Debt)/GDP in nominal
terms, D2=(Foreign Debt)/GDP in nominal terms, FX1=(Reserves of the Central Bank)/GDP
in nominal terms, and FX2= (Country´s Reserves)/GDP in nominal terms.
Data sources: Czech National Bank (CNB), Czech Statistical Office (CSU).
Similarly to indicators of debt sustainability, the indicators of solvency did not
signal serious problems until 1996. Table 5 illustrates that the ratios of interest
payments to export did not exceed the solvency limits. Moreover, the ratios of
reserves to imports remained relatively high.
Table 5
Indicators of Solvency (in %)
R1 R2 R3 FX/IMP1 FX/IMP2
1992 6.63 4.82 3.54   5.36  7.00
1993 5.11 3.75 3.75 22.75 22.75
1994 5.77 4.28 4.28 32.75 32.75
1995 6.06 4.61 5.57 54.52 46.74
1996 8.65 6.33 6.20 36.27 36.74
Notes: Indicators are defined as follows: R1=(Debt Interest Payments)/(Exports of Goods and
Services from BOP accounts), R2=(Debt Interest Payments)/(Exports of Goods from BOP
accounts), R3=(Debt Interest Payments)/(Exports from GDP accounts in nominal terms),
FX/IMP1=(Reserves of the Central Bank)/(Imports from GDP accounts in  nominal terms),
and FX/IMP2=(Reserves of the Central Bank)/(Imports of Goods and Services from BOP
accounts).
Data sources: Czech National Bank (CNB), Czech Statistical Office (CSU).13
On the other hand, the financial indicators presented in Table 6 show that
vulnerability  of  financial sector towards capital outflow was enlarged as financial
markets deepened gradually. Specifically, the volumes of financial assets traded on
the Prague Stock Exchange increased with respect to the official foreign reserves.
This vulnerability was not reflected in  residents´ expectations. Small weigh of
deposits in foreign currency did not indicate that they would expect external
imbalance to jeopardise the exchange rate stability.
Table 6
Financial Indicators (in %)
M1/FX M2/FX Df/FX S/FX B/FX
1993 317.98 637.72 50.49   2.01  1.12
1994 234.30 484.18 33.95 15.50  8.63
1995 121.67 279.34 23.64 21.14 15.57
1996 131.87 316.39 24.63 49.13 21.06
Notes: Indicators are defined as follows: M1/FX=(Narrow Money)/(Reserves of the Central
Bank), M2/FX=(Broad Money)/(Reserves of the Central Bank), Df/FX=(Deposits in Foreign
Currency)/(Reserves of the Central Bank), S/FX = (Equities-Annual Trade
Volumes)/(Reserves of the Central Bank), B/FX=(Bonds-Annual Trade Volumes)/(Reserves
of the Central Bank).
Data sources: Czech National Bank (CNB), Czech Statistical Office (CSU).
The analysis of sources of foreign reserves reveals that in 1996 there was
rather dramatic change in trends of development (See Figure 3). Not only the foreign
official reserves started falling, the share of stable sources (such as foreign reserves
earned by the current account surplus or receivables from foreign direct investment
projects) felt significantly. As a consequence, the vulnerability of the Czech economy
to external instabilities increased.14
Figure 3
















Notes: The series are defined as follows (billion crowns): FX=Reserves of the central bank,
Long-term Capital= Cumulative inflow of long-term capital as defined by the BOP accounts,
Portfolio Inv.= Cumulative inflow of portfolio investment as defined by the BOP accounts,
and CA+FDI= Cumulative balance of the current account plus cumulative inflow of foreign
direct investment as defined by the BOP accounts.
Data sources: Czech National Bank (CNB).
Although the indicators of external stability suggested that there was neither a
problem of unsustainable foreign indebtedness nor the problem of solvency, the large
current imbalance placed the Czech economy among the  economies with the
highest deficit in the world
4 that together with some indicators of financial vulnerability
caused worries of possible reverse of capital flows and worsening of conditions on
foreign borrowing. Moreover, some simple indicators of competitiveness that were
watched by markets and formed the expectations signalled that the crown was
overvalued since 1995. The question of how likely a shift in the exchange-rate policy
would be in the near future became topical.
There were several studies that tried to answer this question using different
criteria when judging whether there was the real exchange rate misalignment.
                                                
4 See for example “Emerging Markets Biweekly”, Issue No. 97/10 by GoldmanSachs
that compared various indicators for 26 emerging markets in Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin
America, Middle East and Asia. In this report, in 1996 the Czech Republic had the highest
current account deficit (in % of GDP) and the recommendation for foreign investors was to
stay short in their  crown positions.15
However, they did not give unambiguous answer. Lazarova, Kreidl  (1997) estimated
the equilibrium exchange rate for the Czech economy. The results suggest quite
strong nominal overvaluation of the Czech crown in the end of 1996. However, their
conclusion relied on partial analysis with only two trade equations included in the
model under implicit assumption that the exchange rate was in equilibrium in 1990.
Halpern, Wyplosz (1996) estimated the equilibrium exchange rates for several
transitional economies using the international comparison of dollar wages. For the
Czech Republic, they argue that the initial  undervaluation of the crown was not
completely reversed by the end of 1996 due to a change in national characteristics
such as a size of government sector, GDP per worker, school  enrolment and a ratio
of agriculture-to-industry.
In this paper, the problem of sustainability of the exchange-rate regime of the
Czech crown is analysed using the framework of the fundamental equilibrium
exchange rate (FEER) that has been developed in order to indicate a need for a
change in the economic policy package. The rest of the paper is organised as
follows. The next section summarises the FEER methodology that uses the structural
approach relying on model simulations in order to detect unsustainable external
developments and presents the underlying model. In the third section, the results of
estimations of the FEER for the Czech economy are summarised. The last section
concludes.1617
2. The FEER as a Warning Signal of  
External Crisis
In this study, the FEER is estimated as a potential early-warning signal of
external crisis. As suggested in Clark,  Bartolini,  Bayoumi,  Symansky (1994) and
Williamson (1994) this approach has two important advantages when compared to
other methods. First, if simple indicators are used, the conclusions may be
misleading for neglecting some important factors. For example, indicators based on
the PPP would call for a policy shift although the significant productivity growth and
changes in a country’s portfolio ensure its external stability. Second,  some methods
tend to be backward-looking since they are derived from trends of their determinants
under assumption of a starting point being an equilibrium. On the contrary, when
using the FEER, the structural macro-model allows to capture important links in the
economy and to work in a mode that is more forward-looking since it defines the
equilibrium with respect to the future desired level of foreign indebtedness.
Williamson (1994) summarises reasons why equilibrium exchange rate
changes over time. It can be due to productivity bias, a change in  an asset
equilibrium, unstable relative income elasticity of export and import, or a change in a
country’s relations to the international capital market. These factors are very
important when analysing transitional economy for which a selection of a point of18
initial equilibrium is extremely difficult, and assumption of relevance of backward-
looking trends is debatable. Since the Czech economy has gone through many
transitional changes, and has been catching up with the developed world, the FEER
methodology seems to be appropriate one to find an indicator of external stability.
There are several approaches to defining  and  estimating the equilibrium
exchange rate in real terms that are reviewed mainly in Clark, Bartolini, Bayoumi,
Symansky (1994),  Edwards (1989), Stein, Allen (1995) and Williamson (1994)
5. This
paper follows the FEER approach outlined in Barrell, Wren-Lewis (1989), Williamson
(1994),  Artis, Taylor (1995), and extended in Barrell, Sefton (1997) that uses a
Mundell-Fleming framework in which the internal balance is defined as a medium-
term concept consistent with the NAIRU and the external balance requires trade
balance plus structural flows consistent with the asset market equilibrium.
Since this framework defines the FEER as the real exchange rate achieving
both balances by some date in the medium-run future,  it allows us to use the
interpretation of the equilibrium suitable for a transitional country
6 that can go through
a period of short-run imbalances in order to catch up with the developed world
without loosing the prospect of a medium-run external balance. Specifically, the
FEER approach seems to  be superior to results of partial analysis that consider only
trade balance equilibrium as a benchmark.
The structure of the underlying model can be summarised as follows. The
model works with four trade equations (export of goods, export of services, import of
goods, import of services) that enter together with factor payments on net foreign
assets the current account equation.  In each period, a change in net foreign assets
equals to current account balance enlarged by structural inflows. The external
balance in the model is a normative concept since authorities are assumed to target
a ratio of a change in net foreign assets to nominal GDP (that is equivalent to having
condition on the ratio of foreign indebtedness to GDP):
                                                
5 It is worth noting that definitions of internal and external stability as well as model
framework vary from author to author. Hence the policy implications for preventing an
external crisis depend on the  FEER methodology chosen.
6 The approach has been used for other Asian developing countries in  Barrell,
Anderton, Lansbury, Sefton (1996).19
















where MG is import of goods in volumes, D is final expenditures, E is crown-dollar exchange
rate, P is domestic price (CPI), and Pm* is price of imports defined as effective index of

































where XG is export of goods in volumes, Sg* is foreign demand for goods (effective index),
and Px* is  price of exports defined as effective index from CPI´s of  trading partners,
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where CA is current account balance, r* is foreign real interest rate, and F-1 is net foreign
assets in the end of previous period,
(6)  F CA F = + -1 + FDI,
where F is net foreign assets in the end of current period, and FDI is exogenous structural








where t is a ratio targeted by authorities, and Y is real GDP.20
The next two equations ensure internal balance for domestic economy by
projecting the inflation non-accelerating growth rate of GDP, and subsequently,
deriving final expenditures from policy scenario for government expenditures and real
financial wealth of the private sector (those variables together provide a measure of
restrictiveness of a mix of fiscal and monetary policy):
(8)   D= .Y .RW +G +XG+ XS 0
1 2 b
b b ,
where D is final expenditures (private demand plus government consumption plus foreign
demand), Y is projected path for GDP, RW is real financial wealth of private sector (includes
both government debt as well as narrow money) and G government consumption,
(9)    P = .ULC .(Px*.E) 0
1 2 p
p p ,
where P is domestic price and ULC is unit labour cost implied by the projected path of the
GDP.
In the model, there are three categories of exogenous variables: ( i) foreign
variables (r*, FDI, Pm*, Px*, S*, Sg*),  (ii)  domestic variables that are projected
according to their medium-run trends (ULC, Y) and (iii) domestic variables that
represent the policy scenario (G, RW, t). The FEER is obtained when solving the
system for the real exchange rate (Px*.E/P) that is compatible with the target t in the
equation (7). Consequently, the path of the  FEER is a normative result that depends
on what authorities in the model consider to be a sustainable current account deficit.
It is worth noting that the path of the FEER is formed by the paths of exogenous
variables and by important elasticities in export, import, consumption functions and
price equation. Also, the initial stock of net foreign assets determines the path of
solution.21
3. Search for the Crown’s FEER
In order to apply the FEER methodology to the Czech case it was necessary to
find the parameters for the above presented model framework. For this purpose, the
long-run structure of the Czech satellite model has been used. The satellite model
has been estimated as a part of the NIGEM (National Institute Global Econometric
Model) in a dynamic form as described in Šmídková (1997). Although estimates of
some equations were not completely satisfactory and quarterly data series were
relatively short (1992-1996), the set of obtained long-run coefficients that are
important when solving for the FEER was verified by model simulations. They proved
to yield satisfactory results in the case of a simulation of a nominal depreciation




  s2 Import of goods to final expenditures   1.47
  s3 Import of goods to real exchange rate   0.45
  d2 Import of services to final expenditures   1.08
  d3 Import of services to real exchange rate   0.68
  c2 Export of goods to foreign demand   1.00*
  c3 Export of goods to real exchange rate   0.81
  z2 Export of services to foreign demand   1.54
  z3+1 Export of services to real exchange rate   0.9
  b1 Private demand to output   0.79
  b2 Private demand to real financial wealth   0.21*
  p1 Domestic prices to ULC   0.65
  p2 Domestic prices to Px*.E   0.35*
Notes: Values of coefficients labelled with (*) have been imposed during estimations.
Exports, imports and foreign demand  are defined in volumes.
As far as exogenous variables are concerned, twelve scenarios have been
defined that differ in assumptions about the value of the target t, inflow of  FDI, and
increase in real financial wealth. There have been three  alternative  targets
considered as definitions of sustainable current deficit: ( i) “zero” target (t=0%) in
which authorities strictly define target as a balance - this scenario implies constant
foreign indebtedness, (ii) “ambitious” target (t = -4%) in which authorities assume that
a country will be able to repay higher stock of debt - this scenario implies relatively
fast increase in foreign indebtedness, (iii) “realistic” target (t=-2.04%) in which
authorities allow for low deficit - this scenario implies slower increase in foreign
indebtedness.
There have been two alternative assumptions used on what the structural
flows would be: (i) “low-inflow” assumption takes the average value of FDI inflows
from the whole period of 1991-1996, (ii) “average-inflow” assumption works with
average value of FDI inflows in 1993-1996. The latter assumption is more optimistic
since it considers only the period of relatively high structural inflows attracted to a
significant extent by various privatisation schemes
7.
                                                
7 See  Lansbury, Pain,  Šmídková (1996) for analysis of determinants of the FDI
inflows  in Central and Eastern Europe.23
Similarly, two alternative paths for real financial wealth have  been used for the
purposes of simulations: (i) “restrictive” path has been derived from the actual values
of real financial wealth in 1993-1996 - it reflects the impact of privatisation transfers
as well as of a change in monetary policy stance from neutral to restrictive in the
second half of 1996 (in 1997 the real financial wealth is projected to grow in
accordance with real GDP), (ii) “expansive” path has been defined for the whole
period of 1993-1997 with the  average growth rate of real financial wealth in 1993-
1995 under assumption that the real financial wealth continued growing faster than
real GDP as if the impact of privatisation and neutral monetary policy continued.
The model works with the empirical approximation of the real financial wealth
of the private sector. It is defined as a sum of government bonds in the hands of
private sector, net foreign assets, narrow money and voucher shares that have been
transferred into the hands of private sector during privatisation
8. It implies that the
model assumes  a weak form of the Ricardian equivalence to hold. Consequently,
although in the model the real financial wealth is a policy variable that functions as an
important factor in determining the degree of real exchange rate misalignment, it is
not possible to distinguish whether is was  fiscal or monetary policy that drove the
real exchange rate out of the FEER corridor. It is always a mix of policies that is









 1  0.00 restrictive average
 2 -4.00 restrictive average
 3 -4.00 restrictive low
 4 -2.04 restrictive average
 5  0.00 restrictive low
 6 -2.04 restrictive low
 7  0.00 expansive average
 8 -4.00 expansive average
 9 -4.00 expansive low
                                                
8  See Allen, Šmídková (1997) for description of voucher privatisation scheme and
analysis of the impact of voucher privatisation on private  sector´ s demand for goods and
financial assets.24
10 -2.04 expansive average
11  0.00 expansive low
12 -2.04 expansive low
Notes: Value of t is target for current account, real financial wealth is a policy variable
determined by  a mix of monetary and fiscal policies as well as  privatisation strategy, FDI is
structural inflow (foreign direct investment).
As far as other exogenous variables are concerned, the paths of foreign
variables  have been set equal to observed values (the NiGEM forecast has been
used for 1997) for all twelve scenarios. For 1997, government consumption has been
set equal to trend values since it was stable for a sample period. The path for real
GDP has been derived from average annual growth rate over the period of 1991-
1996. This assumption implies the growth rate slightly below 1%
9.
The model simulations have been run for the period of 1993-1997 (four
quarters out of sample) in order to detect whether (and when) the FEER started
diverging significantly from the corridor implied by the exchange-rate regime of the
Czech crown. Twelve paths of the FEER obtained from simulations under alternative
scenarios (described in Table 8) have been used in order to construct a corridor of
FEER´s. The FEER corridor captures some of the uncertainty linked with
assumptions that were necessary for model solutions. In order to relate the FEER
corridor to the limits of the exchange-rate regime, the real exchange-rate corridor has
been constructed that shows the maximum possible  exchange-rate movements
implied by the bands.
The two following Figures compare the results of the FEER simulations for two
categories of solutions. Figure 4 shows the FEER corridor for scenarios 1-6 from
Table 8 that assume restrictive economic policies took place. On the contrary, Figure
5 presents the FEER corridor based on scenarios 7-12 from Table 8 that assume
expansive economic policies took place. This implies that centre values of the two
FEER corridors differ due to  simulation path for the real financial wealth while the
bands of the FEER corridors are determined by a sensitivity of solutions to the
assumptions about  the scope of  FDI flows  and the level of a target t.
                                                
9 The attempt has been made to test sensitivity of assumption about the underlying
growth rate. However, when the growth rate has been set higher then the average, the results
produced have not been satisfactory due to inability of the model to account for medium-run

















































































































































Notes: CZRER is the real effective exchange rate of the Czech crown. The FEER corridor has
been constructed around the average value of the FEER solutions of  scenarios 1-6 (Table 8)
under assumption of restrictive economic policies. The bands ( CZRERlow,  CZRERhigh)

















































































































































Notes: CZRER is the real effective exchange rate of the Czech crown. The FEER corridor has
been constructed around the average value of the FEER solutions of  scenarios 7-12 (Table 8)26
under assumption of expansive economic policies. The bands ( CZRERlow,  CZRERhigh)
show the limits of the exchange-rate regime.
Both expansive as well as restrictive scenarios start indicating the
overvaluation of the Czech crown since 1996. In both cases, the real exchange rate
left the FEER corridor. However, the two categories differ in the scale of
overvaluation implied. In the first quarter of 1996, the real overvaluation was from 0.4
to 6.8% according to expansive scenarios while it was -1.4 to 5.4% according to
restrictive ones. In the end of 1996, expansive scenarios signal the real overvaluation
from 5.8 to 11.2% and the restrictive scenarios from 2.1 to 8.5%. Also, restrictive
scenarios signal the overvaluation problem one quarter later than expansive ones.
Summing up results of model simulations, the FEER methodology indicate that
there was a  real exchange-rate misalignment of the Czech crown in 1996. Since the
construction of the FEER corridor takes into account both the behaviour of the real
economy as well as the financial side of the economy (specifically the impact of
foreign indebtedness on the current account), this conclusion could be used as an
early-warning signal for policy-makers.27
4. Conclusions
In May 1997, the speculative attack on the Czech crown emphasised the
importance of watching early-warning signals
10 that would indicate to policy-makers
that applied  mix of economic policies is not consistent with the development of the
economy and with the exchange-rate regime. The previous sections demonstrated
that in 1996 some indicators, specifically those working with long-run horizon such as
criteria of debt sustainability, offered a relatively optimistic view. Other indicators
gave warning that there might be a danger of capital outflow if foreign investors, and
subsequently domestic agents, emphasised short-run analysis or indicators based on
the PPP.
                                                
10  Since external crises impose ex post large fiscal costs on the government because of
bailouts of banks, firms as well as costs of external borrowing necessary for supporting the
currency under attack, many economic studies both theoretical and empirical suggest that
research should aim at finding good early-warning signals. The experience of surveyed
countries suggest that in the case of unsustainable external development an early policy shift
reduces costs of external imbalances to a large extent. Artis, Taylor (1995) provide a rule of
thumb that when five years adjustment to initial 15% overvaluation depreciate FEER by
additional 2.5%  in comparison to immediate adjustment.28
The view formed by the methodology of the FEER simulations fits somewhere
in between. The FEER corridors identified a relatively small-scale real overvaluation
of the Czech crown  for the end of 1996. If one takes into account the sensitivity of
results with respect to assumptions, and compares the bands of the FEER corridor
with the bands of the corridor implied by the limits of the exchange-rate regime, it is
possible to argue that under assumption of the early applied restrictive economic
policy mix, there was a space for the exchange rate to accommodate without a
necessity to change the exchange-rate regime itself. It is important to note that the
FEER methodology detects the problem of potential external crisis by declaring a real
exchange rate misalignment. However, although the real exchange rate is in the
centre of analysis, the signalled misalignment should be viewed as a consequence of
the mix of events rather than of an inappropriate exchange-rate policy alone
11.
                                                
11 The ambiguity of the concept of real equilibrium exchange rate is recognised by
Breuer in Williamson (1994) who exposes a problem of  whether desired exchange rate
system should ensure internal and external stability or whether policies should be designed to
create the internal and external conditions under which the desired equilibrium naturally
emerges? The conflict between tools and targets is also, explained in Williamson (1994). If a
target zone is the selected exchange-rate regime, fiscal policy becomes a tool for defending
the zone, and cannot be designed according to other fiscal rule. Adding to the difficulties,
there is not an agreement on which policy tool (whether fiscal or monetary policy) should be
assigned to the exchange-rate target.29
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